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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LESTER E. CANNON and 
MARGARET CANNON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
Case No. 
-vs-
ORVAL WRIGHT, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action to recover the amount due on a 
promissory note, together with costs and attorney's fees 
on the part of the plaintiffs and a counter-claim on the 
part of the Def endent to recover the value of an air com-
pressor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable A. John 
1 
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Ruggeri, sitting without a jury. The trial court entered a 
judgement against the Plaintiffs dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice, and a judgment of a like nature against 
the Defendant's counter-claim. The attorney for the De-
fendant submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law for the courts approval which were subsequently 
signed by the court. The Plaintiffs filed Objections to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions asking the court for 
more specific findings and these objections were not rul-
ed on by the court. The Plaintiffs also moved for a new 
trial which later motion was overruled and denied by the 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the Judgment againt the 
Plaintiffs of the trial court reversed and remanded with 
instructions to enter judgment against the Defendant 
Orval Wright, for the amount due on the promissory note 
and for a reasonable attorney's fees and costs, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Orval Wright had been active in the 
Southern Utah area in the development and sale of sub-
division properties, particularly in the Kolob area of 
Washington County, Utah. Mr. Wright prevailed upon 
the Plaintiffs and others to invest in a particular project 
of development and sale. It eventually developed that the 
United States Government was interested in aquiring part 
of the particular project for an addition to the National 
Park and for that purpose commenced an action in emin-
ent domain in the U. S. District Court, Central Division 
for the State of Ut'ah. The parties to that action were re-
presented by Attorney Owen Nitz of Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and also by Utah counsel. The parties were paid the orig-
inal appraised value of the property by the U. S. Govern-
ment and pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the 
monies were paid to Mr. Nitz who was to disperse part of 
2 
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the funds and retain the rest in his trust account to cover 
costs, etc., until the action was concluded. 
On March 14, 1964, the Plaintiff and his wife and the 
Defendant met in the office of Owen Nitz in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, for the purpose of obtaining part of the money 
they had received in the first payment by the U. S. Gov-
ernment. Each party received a specific sum, but by rea-
son of an agreement between the Plaintiffs and Defend-
ant, the Plaintiffs loaned the Defendant the Six Thousand 
($6,000) Dollars that they were to receive. This was done 
by having Mr. Nitz issue his trust account check no. 7293, 
dated March 14, 1964, to Lester Cannon and Margaret 
Cannon, who then in turn endorsed the check and deliver-
ed it to Orval Wright. At that same time a note was pre-
pared, no one remembering clearly who prepared the 
same, it being a printed form note modified for the pur-
pose, but signed by Mr. Wright on the face thereof and 
initialed on the back following an additional provision. 
Mr. Wright, after some urging, admitted both the signing 
and the initialing. The note was then delivered by Mr. 
Wright to Lester Cannon who had the note in his sole 
possession until the time this action was commenced. The 
check for Six Thousand ($6,000) Dollars given to Orval 
Wright was subsequently endorsed by Orval Wright who 
received the proceeds thereof. 
The note provided in the hand written portion for 
payment as follows: "On the day payment is received by 
the undersigned from the United States Government in 
settlement of Civil Action No. C-114-63 in the United 
States District Court of The State of Utah, Central Divis-
ion, and undersigned does hereby assign to payees as sec-
urity for this (over) note the sum of $6,000 from any set-
tlement paid the undersigned as a result of said civil ac-
tion no. C-114-63." 
The testimony was to the effect that settlement was 
made sometime in 1965, although the parties were some-
what vague. The note was then due and payable. It ap-
3 
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pears from the testimony that neither party was present 
at the time any final disbursements were made in the 
civil action in the U. S. District Court, but rather settle-
ment payments were made by mail or otherwise by Owen 
Nitz. Plaintiff testified that he had not received payment 
of the note and the Defendant admitted that he personal-
ly had not paid the note, but had not received any final 
payment from Attorney Nitz. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW AND AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE BY HOLDING THE PROMISE OF THE SIX 
THOUSAND ($6,000) DOLLAR NOTE TO BE CONDI-
TIONAL, AND IN LIMITING THE DEFENDANT'S LIA-
BILITY TO THE MONIES FROM THE FUND WHICH 
MERELY SECURED THE DEBT. 
The law traditionally favors negotiability of notes, 
and thus, the law favors the unconditionality of promises 
in notes. When a note is primarily unconditional, clear 
and explicit language is needed to make the promise con-
ditional. This attitude towards promises serves two pur-
poses, to prevent unnecessary litigations, and to insure 
the integrity of notes which merely make reference to 
the underlying transaction. This preference and purpose 
is shown in C. H. Mountjoy Part Co. v. San Antonio Nat'l 
Bank, 12 S. W. 2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928); Jones v. 
Green, 293 S, W. 749, 173 Ark. 846 (1927); and Branch 
Banking & Trust Co. v. Leggett, 116 S, E. 1, 185 N. C. 65 
(1923). 
The common law view is also expressed in the stat-
utes dealing with commercial paper, 70-A-3-105 (1) (f), 
UCA (1953). The statute provides that a promise is not 
made conditional by the fact that it refers to any fund or 
source from which reimbursement is expected. The stat-
ute continues, at 70A-3-105 (2) (b), by stating that a pro-
4 
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mise is conditional only if the note states that it is to be 
paid only out of a particular fund. 
Upon examining the $6,000 note in light of the stat-
ute, the error of the trial court becomes evident. The note 
begins with an unconditional promise to pay, and then 
says, " and the undersigned does hereby assign to the 
payees as security for this note the sum of $6,000 from 
any settlement paid to the undersigned as a result of said 
civil action no. C-114-63." Two things are demonstrated: 
First, that there is no language that in any way limits 
payment from only a particular fund; and second, that 
the monies from the expected settlement was only addi-
tional security for the personal obligation of the Defend-
ant, and as such was only a mere expected source of re-
imbursement for the debtor/Defendant. This clear and 
unambiguous language leaves no room for speculation as 
to its meaning, and there is certainly no way to interpret 
the language in a way that would make the Defendant's 
promise to pay conditional. However, the trial court held 
that the promise was conditional, in direct contradiction 
to the applicable law, as shown in language and purpose 
of the commercial paper statutes. 
A variety of cases restate the common law and statu-
tory rules (further demonstrating the error of the trial 
court), in cases where a source of expected reimburse-
ment is mentioned in a promissory note. In Jones v. Green, 
293 S. W. 749, 173 Ark. 846 (1927), the court found a pro-
mise to be unconditional when the note recited, "The tolls 
collected under lease dated February 17, 1922 will be 
credited on the face of the note until paid." It should be 
noted that the language in that case was more restrictive 
than on the $6,000 note in question now. In the case of 
Branch Banking & Trust v. Leggett, 116 S. E. 1, 185 N. C. 
65 (1923), the court found the promise of a note to be un-
conditional when the note made reference to a fund from 
which payment was expected. The Louisiana court simi-
larly found a promise to be unconditional in Muhoberac v. 
5 
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Saloon, Inc., 210 So. 2d 572 (LA. 1968). In that case, the 
court said that the language of a note must say that it is 
payable only out of a particular fund, or it will be held to 
be merely security additional to the personal obligation 
of the makers. Also see Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 of 
Howard County v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. of 
Memphis, Tenn., 272 S. W. 834, 169 Ark. 43 (1925), and 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Miller, 172 So. 557 (LA 
1937). 
Clearly the promise is unconditional, and the liability 
of the Defendant is not limited by the monies of the ex-
pected fund which only secured the debt. 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW AND AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF EVI-
DENCE, BY FINDING AN ACCORD AND SETTLEMENT 
OF THE DEBT MERELY FROM THE FACT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT NEVER RECEIVED MONIES FROM THE 
FUND FROM WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAD EXPECT-
ED REIMBURSEMENT. 
In the argument of Point I, it was shown that the 
Trial Court errored in determining that the Defendant 
was not personally liable on his unconditional promise to 
pay his debt. This error in the interpretation of the com-
mercial paper statute, 70A-3-105, UCA (1958), resulted in 
a second error. The second error was in determining that 
merely because the debtor/Defendant did not receive 
money from the fund as he expected for reimbursement, 
the Defendant's unconditional promise to pay and his un-
derlying debt were completely extinguished. The argu-
ment of Point I clearly shows that the debtor/Defendant's 
promise to pay was to exist even though the expected 
source of reimbursement, which acted only as addition 
security, was never received by the Defendant as he had 
hoped. 
Since the TWal Court's first error led to the second 
6 
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error, it is obvious that the entire matter can be remedied 
by a finding tha t the promise to pay in the $6,000 note is 
unconditional, which in turn would lead to the correct re-
sult of the Defendant being personally liable on the debt, 
and that his duty to pay would in no way be limited mere-
ly because the source of reimbursement never arose for 
the Defendant. This result is especially proper, because 
in the arguments that follow, it is shown that no other 
theories of law, or facts of evidence, exist which would 
allow the Defendant to avoid payment of the debt evi-
denced by the $6,000 note. 
POINT i n 
THE PLAINTIFF AS HOLDER OF THE NOTE, ES^ 
TABLISHED HIS RIGHT TO ENFORCE; PAYMENT OF 
THE NOTE, AND ESTABLISHED THE LIABILITY OF 
THE DEFENDANT ON THE NOTE. 
The Plaintiff is a holder of the note. UCA 70A-1-201 
(20), (1953) (Nevada Revised Statutes 104.1201 subsection 
•20, (1973) defines a holder as one in possession of an in-
strument drawn, issued, or endorsed to him or his order. 
Since the note is payable to the order of the Plaintiff, and 
since the Plaintiff had possession of the note at all times, 
the Plaintiff is a '"hol'der,?- of the note. 
The Plaintiff, as a holder of the note, has the right to 
enforce payment on the note; UCA, 70A-3-301 (1953), 
(Nev rev stat 104.3301, (1973). 
Because the Plaintiff established the signature of the 
Defendant, and produced the instrument, he is entitled to 
recover on the note, unless the Defendant could establish 
a valid defense; UCA, 70A-3-307 (2), (1953), (Nev rev stat 
104.3307 subsection 2, 1973). The Defendant did not 
specifically deny his signature on the note in the plead-
ings, and therefore his signature is admitted, according 
to the provisions of UCA, 70A-3-307 (1), (1953), (Nev rev 
stat 104.3307 sub 1, 1953). Additionally, the Defendant 
admitted his signature in the course of his testimony at 
7 
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trial. 
Therefore, because signatures are admitted or es-
tablished, production of the instrument entitles the hold-
er, the Plaintiff, to recover on the note, unless the De-
fendant could establish a valid defense. Posession of the 
note by the holder is evidence of non-payment and a pre-
sumption of non-payment. See McCary v. Crumpton, 103 
So. 2d 714, 267 Ala. 484 (1958); Guerin v. Cassidy, 119 A. 
, 2d 780, 38 N. J. Super. 454 (1951); Lurie v. Newhall, 76 N. 
E. 2d 813, 333 111. App. 173 (1947). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DISMISSING 
THE COMPLAINT BE3CAUSE THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT 
TO RECOVER ON THE NOTE WAS ESTABLISHED, 
WHILE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY 
EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT SATISFY HIS BURDEN OF 
PROVING A VALID DEFENSE. 
A. The Defendant claimed payment or satisfaction as 
a defense, he therefore had the burden to prove that pay-
ment was made. UCA, 70A-3-307 (2) (1953), (Nev rev stat 
104.3307 sub 2, 1973) states that when a note is produced 
and the signatures are established, the Defendant is liable 
unless he can establish a defense. The common law simi-
larly is that payment is an affirmative defense, and that 
the party alleging the defense has the burden of proving 
payment. See Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 262, 311 P2d 788 
(1957); State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 
Utah 416, 25 P2d 612 (1933); Bell v. Jones, 100 Utah 87, 
110 P2d 327 (1941); and 70 C.J.S. Payment 65 (1951). 
The Defendant's only evidence to support his alleged 
defense of payment was that the funds from the settle-
ment of the civil suit, which were merely collateral secur-
ing the debt, had been distributed. The distribution of 
funds in itself is certainly not sufficient to constitute a 
defense, especially when the obligation of the note is ex-
8 
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amined. See Preston County Coke v. Preston County Light 
& Power, 119 S. E. 2d 420, 146 W. Va. 231 (1961). 
The clear language of the note states that the expect-
ed funds from the settlement were merely to secure the 
debt. There is no indication that the settlement fund was 
to be the sole source of payment, as the Defendant alleges. 
The applicable statutes clearly provide that a promise is 
not made conditional by the fact that the note refers to 
any fund or source from which reimbursement is expect-
ed; UCA, 70A-3-105 (1) (f) (1953), (Nev rev stat 104.3105 
sub 1 para f, 1973). The same statute continues by stating 
that the promise is conditional only if the note states that 
it is to be paid only out of a particular fund or source; UC 
A, 70A-3-105 (2) (b) (1953), (Nev rev stat 104.3105 sub 2 
para b, 1973). There is no language in the note that 
would make it payable only from the settlement fund, or 
in any other way conditional upon the distribution of the 
settlement fund. Therefore, even though the funds are not 
available to pay the note as expected, the Defendant is 
still on his unconditional promise to pay the debt. There 
is no basis in the Defendant's allegations that his liability 
is discharged merely because the fund was distributed 
which secured the debt. 
The Plaintiff had no obligation to exhaust the secur-
ity, or attempt to collect payment from the settlement 
fund which secured the debt, before suing on the under-
lying obligation. UCA, 70A-9-501, (1953), (Nev rev stat 
104.9501, 1973), states that when a debtor is in default, 
a secured party may reduce his claim to a judgement, 
foreclose, or otherwise enforce the security interest by 
any available judicial procedure. The purpose of the 
statute was to provide secured parties with a variety of 
remedies upon default. The Plaintiff was not limited to 
seek recovery only by foreclosing on the settlement fund 
Which served merely as collateral. Therefore, even 
though the Plaintiff did not seek recovery from the settle-
ment fund, he is free to reduce his claim to a judgement 
9 
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by suing on the underlying obligation. See AM JUR 69 2d 
Secured Transactions S548 (1973). 
Since it is clear that distribution of the settlement 
fund itself does not discharge the Defendant's liability on 
the note, the only remaining allegation of payment by the 
Defendant is that the settlement fund was distributed, in 
part, as payment for the note. The Defendant presented 
no evidence to prove the specific payment of the note, 
but only testified that he assumed that the note had been 
paid from the settlement fund distribution. Actually, a 
variety of transactions had taken place involving the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant, to which funds from the set-
tlement were applied. When several obligations between 
parties exist and one party claims that a payment was to 
be applied to a particular obligation, the burden of proof 
is on that party to prove the specific application of the 
payment. This placement of the burden of proof is clear-
ly established by Light v. Stevens, 159 Cal 288, 113 P. 659 
(1911); State Finance Co. v. Hershel California Fruit Pro-
ducts Co., 8 Cal App 2d 524, 47 P2d 821 (1935); Redwine v. 
Rohlff Lumber & Supply Co., 54 Wyo 253, 91 P2d 49 
(1939); and C.J.S. Payment S97 (1951). Therefore, even 
though the Plaintiff received part of the funds from the 
settlement, the Defendant still had the burden to prove 
that the funds were to be specifically applied as payment 
for the note. Because the Defendant has failed to present 
any evidence of the specific application of the settlement 
fund distribution and because he admits no other pay-
ment, his defense of payment has no basis. 
Additional evidence of non-payment is the fact that 
the Plaintiff retained posession of the note. The obligee's 
possession of the written obligation evidencing the indebt-
edness is evidence of non-payment and raises a presump-
tion of non-payment. See Southward v. Foy, 65 Nev 694, 
201 P2d 302 (1948); Light v. Stevens, 159 Cal 288, 113 P. 
659 (1911); and 70 C.J.S. Payment SS99 (1951). Because 
the Plaintiff has possessed the note at all times with no 
10 
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evidence of cancellation or renunciation on the face of 
the instrument, the above presumption of non-payment 
applies. Retention of the note by the Plaintiff is fully in-
consistent with the allegations of payment as claimed by 
the Defendant, and is also inconsistent with the ordinary 
course of business which would require delivery or can-
cellation of a note upon payment. 
It is obvious that the Defendant has failed to over-
come the presumptions of non-payment and has failed to 
present any evidence to prove or establish his alleged 
payment. 
B. The release signed by Margaret Cannon Sullen 
was invalid as a means to discharge the Defendant's lia-
bility on the note, and in any event her interest had term-
inated before the release was signed. 
The note was payable to Lester Cannon and Margaret 
Cannon jointly, not in the alternative. UCA, 70A-3-116 (b) 
(1953) (Nev rev stat 104.3116 1973), states that if an in-
strument is payable to two or more persons and not in 
the alternative, it is payable to all of them and may be 
discharged only by all of them. Therefore, the release by 
Margaret C. Sullen alone could not discharge the Defend-
ant's liability on the note. 
Additionally, the statutes on discharge only allow 
cancellation or renunciation by the holder of an instru-
ment; UCA, 70A-3-605 (1973), (Nev rev stat 104.3605 
1973). Since Lester Cannon had possession of the note at 
all times, Margaret C. Sullen could not have been a "hold-
er" to effectively discharge the Defendant's liability. 
In any event, Margaret Cannon Sullen's interest was 
terminated by a divorce property settlement prior to the 
signing of the release. 
Therefore, the release not only did not discharge the 
Defendant's liability on the note, but also was completely 
ineffective because Margaret Cannon Sullen's interest 
11 
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had been previously terminated. 
C. The Defendant had the burden to prove his allega-
tion of failure of consideration. As shown above, UCA, 
70A-3-307 (2) (1953), (Nev rev stat 104.3307 sub 2 1973), 
states that when the note is produced and signatures es-
tablished, the Defendant is liable unless he can establish 
a defense. In effect, there is a presumption of adequate 
consideration. Evidence was presented by the Plaintiff 
that the Defendant received Six Thousand ($6,000) Dol-
lars by check from the Plaintiff, at or near the time he 
signed the note for $6,000. The Defendant failed to pre-
sent any evidence that there was not full consideration. 
Because the burden of proof was on the Defendant, and 
because he failed to offer any proof , his claimed defense 
of failure of consideration is without basis. 
In any event, the Defendant admitted at trial tha t 
there was consideration and withdrew the claim in favor 
of a defense of payment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff, as holder of the note, fully established 
his claim in lower court by producing the note and estab-
lishing the signatures. The Defendant had the burden to 
prove that he had a valid defense. However, the Defend-
ant presented no evidence at all that would overcome 
presumptions of full consideration and non-payment, or 
the evidence presented by the Plaintiff. 
Therefore, the trial court errored in holding that the 
note was to be paid from a specific fund and by improper-
ly placing the burden of proof on the Plaintiff to show 
that there were no defenses, and by improperly finding 
that the Defendant had met his burden of proof, in the 
absence of any facts or evidence to support such a finding, 
and contrary to the clear weight of evidence in support of 
the Plaintiff. 
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Therefore, the trial court should be reversed and 
judgement for the Plaintiff granted in the amount of Six 
Thousand ($6,000) Dollars on the note, plus costs and at-
torney fees as required in the note. In the alternative to 
reversal for the Plaintiff, the case should be remanded to 
the lower court for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT L. GARDNER 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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